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Abstract
Background: The persistence of cooperative relationships is an evolutionary paradox; selection
should favor those individuals that exploit their partners (cheating), resulting in the breakdown of
cooperation over evolutionary time. Our current understanding of the evolutionary stability of
mutualisms (cooperation between species) is strongly shaped by the view that they are often
maintained by partners having mechanisms to avoid or retaliate against exploitation by cheaters. In
contrast, we empirically and theoretically examine how additional symbionts, specifically specialized
parasites, potentially influence the stability of bipartite mutualistic associations. In our empirical
work we focus on the obligate mutualism between fungus-growing ants and the fungi they cultivate
for food. This mutualism is exploited by specialized microfungal parasites (genus Escovopsis) that
infect the ant's fungal gardens. Using sub-colonies of fungus-growing ants, we investigate the
interactions between the fungus garden parasite and cooperative and experimentally-enforced
uncooperative ("cheating") pairs of ants and fungi. To further examine if parasites have the potential
to help stabilize some mutualisms we conduct Iterative Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) simulations, a
common framework for predicting the outcomes of cooperative/non-cooperative interactions,
which incorporate parasitism as an additional factor.
Results: In our empirical work employing sub-colonies of fungus-growing ants, we found that
Escovopsis-infected sub-colonies composed of cheating populations of ants or fungi lost significantly
more garden biomass than sub-colonies subjected to infection or cheating (ants or fungi) alone.
Since the loss of fungus garden compromises the fitness of both mutualists, our findings suggest that
the potential benefit received by the ants or fungi for cheating is outweighed by the increased
concomitant cost of parasitism engendered by non-cooperation (cheating). IPD simulations
support our empirical results by confirming that a purely cooperative strategy, which is
unsuccessful in the classic IPD model, becomes stable when parasites are included.
Conclusion: Here we suggest, and provide evidence for, parasitism being an external force that
has the potential to help stabilize cooperation by aligning the selfish interests of cooperative
partners in opposition to a common enemy. Specifically, our empirical results and IPD simulations
suggest that when two mutualists share a common enemy selection can favor cooperation over
cheating, which may help explain the evolutionary stability of some mutualisms.
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The stability of cooperation is an evolutionary paradox –
partners should be selected to cheat, pursuing their own
selfish interests by obtaining benefits without providing a
reward in return. Despite the inherent selfishness of indi-
viduals, cooperation within and between species is com-
mon in nature [1-3]. Hamilton's Kin Selection Theory [4]
helps explain cooperation among closely related individ-
uals: organisms increase their fitness through altruism
with close relatives due to their shared genes. The main
theories used to help explain cooperation among unre-
lated individuals have been categorized as either directed
reciprocation or by-product benefits [5]. Many of the
models that fit the former category, including host sanc-
tion and partner fidelity, have developed out of, and are
supported by, years of game theory modelling and focus
on how individuals avoid being exploited by their part-
ners [6-10]. Specifically, within directed reciprocation
cooperation is thought to be maintained when partners
prevent one another from pursuing their own selfish
interests ("cheating"), such as retaliation against cheating.
However, empirical support for mechanisms of directed
reciprocation that stabilize interspecific mutualisms is
mostly lacking [5,10].
Studies on the stability of mutualisms have generated
extensive and valuable information about cooperation
between unrelated individuals. However, these studies
have primarily been framed within the traditional view of
pair-wise partner associations occurring in isolation [10-
12], while it is becoming increasingly clear that mutual-
isms are usually embedded within complex ecological
communities [11,13-22], and that these additional symbi-
onts or interactants (tertiary, quaternary etc.) play impor-
tant roles in mutualism dynamics. Indeed, third parties
have been shown to alter the intensity, outcomes, and
ultimately even the symbiotic state (mutualistic or para-
sitic) of an association (see [11] for review). For example,
some mutualisms are known to exist only in the presence
of other species, such as protective mutualisms where the
presence of natural enemies is required for benefits to be
conferred [17,23-26]. In addition, recent work on bird-
dispersed pine trees has revealed that the presence/
absence of a competitor, pine squirrels, alters selection on
a trait specifically associated with the bird-pine mutual-
ism [27]. This illustrates that selection imposed on a
mutualism by a third party can disrupt the success and/or
stability of the association. Despite mounting evidence to
support the importance of additional symbionts and
community members in the biology of mutualisms, the
concept has not yet been extensively explored with respect
to the evolutionary stability of mutualisms.
Parasites of mutualisms may be particularly important in
altering the dynamics of cooperative relationships in ways
that influence their stability. Parasites not only drive host
evolution, they also shape community dynamics by indi-
rectly influencing the organisms their hosts interact with.
The indirect influence of parasites should be especially
pronounced within mutualistic relationships, as increased
morbidity and mortality caused by a parasite of one part-
ner will significantly influence the success of the other
partner [28,29]. Since cooperative partners frequently face
a 'common enemy' in the form of parasites, we hypothe-
size that the presence of an abundant and virulent parasite
of one member of a mutualism could provide selective
pressure such that cooperation between partners is
favored over exploitation. Our hypothesis is similar to tri-
adic models developed by social scientists to investigate
the role of third parties in cooperative dynamics among
humans [30], however as mentioned above, the impact of
additional players on the evolutionary stability of mutual-
isms has not been examined empirically.
The mutualism between fungus-growing ants and the
fungi they cultivate for food is an example of a cooperative
relationship that has persisted over evolutionary time
despite continual impact from a virulent parasite
[1,28,31-33]. To test our hypothesis that parasites may
stabilize cooperative relationships, we experimentally
manipulated sub-colonies of fungus-growing ants to
determine the impact of parasites on (i) ants with fungal
partners who provide decreased benefit to ants (cheater
fungi), and (ii) fungi being tended by ants who provide
limited benefits and increased costs to the fungus garden
(cheater ants). We explore our empirical results further by
utilizing the classic Iterative Prisoner's Dilemma model
[34] to confirm how the addition of a virulent parasite
influences the traditional victors of the model: Always
Defect and Tit for Tat.
Methods
Fungus-growing ant symbiosis
Ants in the tribe Attini engage in an obligate mutualism
with basidiomycetous fungi (Lepiotaceae and Pteru-
laceae) [1,35]. The fungus is maintained in specialized
gardens, often subterranean, and ant workers forage for
substrate to support the growth of their fungal mutualist
and help protect it from potential competitors or para-
sites. The fungus is vertically transmitted between genera-
tions, with new queens carrying a fungal pellet, collected
from their natal garden, on the nuptial flight [36]. In
exchange for these benefits, the fungus serves as the pri-
mary food source for the ant colony. Fungal cultivation in
ants has a single origin, ~45 million years ago [37]. The
subsequent evolutionary history has generated a diverse
collection of ants (more than 230 species) and fungi.
The fungus-growing ant symbiosis is a good model system
to investigate the ecological and evolutionary effects para-Page 2 of 9
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bionts are widely distributed in the new world tropics,
and are conspicuous and populous enough to allow for
adequate collection. Second, symbionts are amenable to
laboratory maintenance, being readily cultivable, thus
allowing researchers to study and manipulate each symbi-
ont separately and in combination. Third, an entire tribe
of ants culture fungi for food. Each lineage in the tribe
tends specific fungal cultivars, which each host specialized
mycoparasites in the genus Escovopsis (Ascomycota: Hypo-
creales). Escovopsis exploits the ant-fungal mutualism by
extracting nutrients from the fungal mycelium at a signif-
icant cost to both the ants (indirectly) and fungi (directly)
[28,38]. The high prevalence of Escovopsis and early origin
in the ant-fungal symbiosis [28,31] suggests that it could
help stabilize the ant-fungal mutualism over evolutionary
time by aligning the selfish interests of the partners
against the parasite.
Experimental design and overview
To empirically test the potential role Escovopsis plays in
stabilizing cooperation between fungus-growing ants and
their cultivated fungi, we investigated the interaction
between the fungus garden parasite and cooperative and
uncooperative ("cheating") pairs of ants and fungi. The
benefits gained by cheating could be diminished if there
is a severe parasitic infection which results in increased
costs to ants or fungi. In this instance, Escovopsis could
help stabilize the ant-fungus mutualism, by selecting
against cheaters. More specifically, if cheating by either
mutualist results in increased morbidity due to the garden
parasite, then the selective advantage of cheating would
be reduced or potentially nullified. We examine this pos-
sibility by using a two-by-two factorial design, crossing
the presence/absence of parasitism with the presence/
absence of a cheating partner. Sub-colonies were ran-
domly assigned to one of four treatments: i) no infection
and no cheating, ii) no infection and cheating, iii) infec-
tion and no cheating or, iv) infection and cheating. "Ant-
cheating" was simulated by altering the male to female
ratio (worker castes are always female, while the only
function of males is reproduction) in Trachymyrmex cf.
zeteki sub-colonies. The ant-cheating treatment mimics
ant colonies investing more energy into colony reproduc-
tion and less into workers that tend the garden. Conse-
quently, there is less investment in colony/garden
maintenance (by worker ants), and additional costs
imposed on the fungus garden while males inhabit the
nest. In separate Atta colombica sub-colonies, "fungus-
cheating" was simulated by removing the specialized
nutrient-rich hyphal swellings (gongylidia) produced by
the cultivated fungus for the ants to feed on. Gongylidia
benefit ants but they are not necessary for cultivar growth
or survival [39], thus removing gongylidia simulates fun-
gal cheating by decreasing the nutrient benefit the fungus
provides the ants. Colony fitness following treatment was
assessed by measuring fungal garden biomass fluctuations
(note: number of ant workers within colonies and colony
production of reproductives is highly correlated to fungus
garden biomass) [28]. The parasitism treatment involved
infecting the ants' fungus garden with the specialized par-
asite Escovopsis. Each treatment is described in detail
below.
Sub-colony setup
Ten six-month-old queenright A. colombica colonies and
10 queenright T. cf. zeteki colonies with a single fungus
chamber were collected in Gamboa, Panama. Sub-colo-
nies of A. colombica were composed of 1.0 g of fungus gar-
den and ~115 ants (consistent ratio of worker size and age
castes, and brood), and were maintained in plastic dual
chambers (one housing the garden, and one for feeding,
foraging, and dumping of refuse) connected by plastic
tubes. Trachymyrmex cf. zeteki sub-colonies were com-
posed of 0.1 g of fungal cultivar and four ants, and housed
in plastic Petri dishes (60 mm diameter). Colonies were
placed on mineral oil islands to prevent potential transfer
of microbes between sub-colonies via vectors (e.g., mites),
were given unrestricted access to foliage (A. colombica) or
a mixture of dried oats and oak catkins (T. cf. zeteki), and
watered three times a week. All sub-colonies used in the
experiment were healthy, stable, incorporating new sub-
strate into the fungus garden, and free of detectable Escov-
opsis infection [15].
Simulation of cheating by ants
To simulate cheating by the ants the sex ratio of T. cf. zeteki
sub-colonies was altered; in cheater sub-colonies two
females and two males were present, while four females
and zero males were present in control sub-colonies. We
use colonies of T. cf. zeteki to simulate cheating by the ants
because this species regularly produces males in the labo-
ratory (A. colombica do not). All worker ants are female,
and female reproductives (gynes) are responsible for
maternal vertical transmission of the fungal mutualist.
Males are reared on the nutrients of the fungal mutualist
and stay within the fungus garden prior to the nuptial
flight however they do not contribute towards tending the
fungus garden. Thus, male ants are a direct cost to the fun-
gus garden; they provide no known benefit to the ant's
fungal mutualist, neither dispersing nor contributing to
fungus garden maintenance [32].
Simulation of cheating fungi
To simulate cheating by the fungal mutualist, 10% of A.
colombica garden biomass (containing ~276 gongylidia
clusters) and all gongylidia clusters on the top surface of
the garden (~265 clusters per nest) were removed. Gongy-
lidia removal was done by hand, using a dissecting scope
(Accu-Scope, Sea Cliff, NY) and jewel-tip forceps (Bio-Page 3 of 9
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simulate cheating by the fungal mutualist because the cul-
tivated fungus of this species produces large, tightly clus-
tered, nutrient-rich hyphal swellings, called gongylidia.
Worker ants preferentially feed on gongylidia and harvest
them as nutrients to support the growth of larvae [32,40].
The production of gongylidia by the cultivated fungi pro-
vides no apparent benefit to the fungus, but instead serves
as a food source that is more beneficial to the ants than
the regular hyphae of the fungus [39,41]. Gongylidia do
not directly benefit the fungus garden and they do not
help defend the garden from Escovopsis (see below). While
T. cf. zeteki fungi also produce gongylidia, they are
smaller, less abundant and fewer per cluster than those of
A. colombica (A. Little pers. obs.). To achieve sufficient
gongylidia removal and limit fungus garden destruction
during sub-colony treatment preparation, it was necessary
to use A. colombica, rather than T. cf. zeteki sub-colonies to
mimic fungal cheating.
Infection of sub-colonies with Escovopsis
Escovopsis strains used in experiments were isolated in
Gamboa, Panama from T. cf. zeteki and A. colombica colo-
nies. Isolates were grown on potato dextrose agar (PDA)
(Difco, Sparks, MD) with 1000 iu/ml of penicillin-strep-
tomycin (MP Biomedicals Inc., Aurora, OH). Spores were
added to ddH2O with Tween 20 [5 × 10-5] (Fisher Scien-
tific, Pittsburgh, PA) to evenly disperse spores in solution.
Trachymyrmex cf. zeteki and A. colombica colonies received
0.05 and 0.5 ml of solution, respectively (ca 6000 spores/
T. cf. zeteki sub-colony, ca. 20000 spores/A. colombica sub-
colony) via mist inoculation. Sub-colony biomass was
measured prior to, and 72 hours after treatment. The rela-
tive changes in biomass/sub-colony/treatment were sub-
jected to 2-way ANOVA in Minitab [42]. The success of the
ants is directly dependent upon the health and biomass of
the fungus gardens, therefore, as in other studies [43,44],
we use garden biomass as an indirect fitness indicator for
the ant in the ant-cheating experiment.
Prisoner's Dilemma computer simulation
Using the classic Prisoner's Dilemma model (PD) [34], we
further explore our empirical results that indicate parasites
can play a role in stabilizing cooperation. In the PD two
players interact, each has the ability to cooperate or cheat.
Cooperation provides the opponent a benefit (b), while
incurring a cost (c) to the player (b > c > 0). The highest
payoff is received when a player cheats while its partner
cooperates: the cheater benefits without paying the cost of
cooperation (Temptation to cheat T = b). If both players
cooperate each receives a net benefit (Reward) of R = b - c,
while mutual cheating results in a Punishment payoff of P
= 0. The lowest payoff is received by a player that cooper-
ates while its opponent cheats (Suckers payoff S = -c). In
single interactions, cheating is the best strategy (T > R > P
> S). Our results from ant-fungal manipulations suggest
that the presence of a parasite would alter the PD payoff
matrix such that pure cooperation is the best strategy.
More specifically, cheating by either ants or fungi results
in an increased parasite impact, reducing the benefit of
'temptation' to cheat (R > T = P > S). In addition, because
cooperation by one player (i.e. ants) provides some
degree of defense against parasitism (i.e. Escovopsis) fur-
ther alters the payoff matrix to favor cooperation (R > T =
P = S).
The Iterative Prisoner's Dilemma Model (IPD), where
players engage in multiple interactions, is much more rel-
evant to natural system. Based on the alteration of the
payoff matrix of the single interaction PD model (see
above), it is clear that if parasites impact every interaction
in the IPD model they will help favor cooperation over
cheating. However, it is very unlikely that parasites are so
ubiquitous in natural populations that they influence
every interaction. Thus, we utilized a computer program
called DILEMMA to determine what level of parasite prev-
alence is required to potentially help stabilize cooperation
within the IPD model [see Additional file 1].
Using DILEMMA, we explored the role of parasites in
altering the dynamics within the IPD model by conduct-
ing simulations involving various combinations of strate-
gies in the presence and absence of parasites. Simulations
involved populations of 10,000 individuals, each individ-
ual engaged in 25 interactions per generation. Simula-
tions were run for 500 generations, which we previously
determined to be sufficient to obtain a stable proportion
of strategies across generations. The average of 100 inde-
pendent runs for each different simulation is presented. In
the first simulation a 50:50 ratio of individuals playing
'always defect' (uncooperative strategy), and 'always
cooperate', (cooperation in every interaction) was used.
Subsequently, simulations using the same 50:50 ratio
with parasites present were run. Ten independent runs
(500 generations each) were run with proportions of para-
sitism increasing by increments of 10%, and the means of
the final frequencies of each strategy in the population
were plotted by proportion of population infected with
parasites. A second set of simulations was conducted, with
three additional strategies ('tit for tat', 'sneaker', and 'ran-
dom' [see Additional file 1]). All strategies started with a
20% frequency in the population. As above, this simula-
tion was run in the absence of parasites for 500 genera-
tions, and then parasites were added with varying
prevalence up to infection rates of 100%.
Results
Empirical test of hypothesis
In our experiments we found that infected sub-colonies
with cheating populations of ants or fungi each lost signif-Page 4 of 9
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to infection or cheating (ants or fungi) alone (2-way
ANOVA p < 0.001 df = 3, for both treatments) (Fig. 1).
When a cheater is present, the cost of Escovopsis infection
is substantially greater than it is in sub-colonies with only
cooperative partners. This suggests that the negative con-
sequences Escovopsis has on ant and fungal health could
result in parasite-induced selection eliminating cheating
by either mutualist. There are several reasons colonies
with cheaters are likely to be less successful at fighting gar-
den infection, than those with cooperative ants and fungi.
Increased virulence of Escovopsis in the "cheating ant"
treatment is likely because the enforced shift to a 50%
male:worker ratio results in fewer worker ants present to
defend the garden from infection [44]. In the "cheating-
fungi" treatment, the mechanism(s) causing a greater
impact of infection is less clear. The high concentration of
nutrients found in gongylidia may be a necessary energy
source for worker ants that remove parasitic spores. The
ants may also retaliate against fungal cheaters by allocat-
ing less effort into garden maintenance, which would
result in greater garden biomass loss during infection.
Prisoner's Dilemma simulations
In the classic model, when one partner always cooperates
and the other always cheats, the cheater population
quickly out-competes the cooperator population (Fig.
2a). In contrast, parasite infection rates of 51% or higher
results in the strategy 'always cooperate' being successful
and stable (Fig. 2b). In the classic model cooperation is
successful and stable if cooperative strategies can retaliate
against cheating, such as the well-known IPD strategy 'tit
for tat' (TFT, Fig. 2c). In our DILEMMA simulations, when
cooperative strategies capable of retaliation against cheat-
ers (i.e., TFT) are included, the strategy "always cooperate"
forms a stable population at infection levels of 10%, and
out-competes TFT when infection levels are greater than
35% (Fig. 2d). These simulations support our empirical
results by indicating that when parasites are common,
cooperation is stable as the benefits gained by cheating are
outweighed by the increased cost of infection.
Discussion
Despite the important role mutually beneficial associa-
tions play in shaping all levels of biological organization,
how these relationships establish and maintain stability is
not well understood. The challenge is elucidating the fac-
tor(s) that prevent selection from favoring partners who
pursue their own selfish interests, cheaters who obtain
benefits without providing rewards in return. Most theo-
ries proposed to help explain the evolutionary stability of
mutualism argue that cooperation is stabilized by individ-
uals employing mechanisms to avoid being exploited by
their partners (e.g., host sanctions, partner choice) [8,45].
In contrast to this typical view that partners enforce reci-
procity within beneficial exchanges, here we suggest, and
provide empirical and theoretic evidence for, the possibil-
ity that an external force, such as parasitism, can help sta-
bilize cooperation by aligning the selfish interests of
partners.
One way parasites may help stabilize mutualisms is if
'cheating' by one partner results in greater parasite-
induced morbidity or mortality in one or both partners,
resulting in a net loss to the 'cheater' (i.e., the benefits
obtained from 'cheating' are diminished by the increased
costs from more severe infection by the parasite). Indeed,
here we found, using the fungus-growing ant mutualism
as a model system, that cheaters can suffer disproportion-
ately more in the presence of a parasite than their non-
cheater counterparts. More specifically, enforced cheating
by either the ants or their fungal partner had little to no
Cheating/infection experimentsFigure 1
Cheating/infection experiments. Two-way interaction 
graph illustrating the impact of experimental infection and 
cheating ants or mutualistic fungi on the garden biomass in 
two types of fungus-growing ant colonies. A) Trachymyrmex 
cf.zeteki sub-colonies (n = 40), treated with crossing the 
presence/absence of fungus garden infection with the pres-
ence/absence of cheating ants, shows significantly higher loss 
of garden biomass when exposed to cheating and infection 
simultaneously than in all other treatments (2-way ANOVA p 
< 0.001 df = 3). B) Atta colombica sub-colonies (n = 80), 
crossing the presence absence of fungus garden infection 
with the presence/absence of cheating fungi, shows a signifi-
cantly greater loss in garden biomass when cheating and 
infection are experienced simultaneously than in all other 
treatments (2-way ANOVA p < 0.001 df = 3). Non-parallel 
lines shown in 'A' and 'B' illustrate significance (2-way 
ANOVA analyses) of the interaction between infection and 
cheating treatments.Page 5 of 9
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both mutualists obligately depend on. In the presence of
the garden parasite, cheating by either mutualist resulted
in significantly higher parasite induced garden morbidity,
as compared to controls involving garden infections with
cooperative mutualist partners. Thus, our empirical
results indicate that the increased impact of parasitism in
the presence of cheating can reduce the inherent conflict
[46-48] between mutualists (Fig. 3), potentially contribut-
ing to the stability of the beneficial association.
Escovopsis can be extremely prevalent, infecting more than
75% of colonies of fungus-growing ant nests in some pop-
ulations, and is known to be virulent [15,28]. Thus, we
believe our results indicate that cheating by either ants or
fungi could be rapidly eliminated within natural popula-
tions by previously established infections or by new infec-
tions of the horizontally transmitted parasite. The
alignment of interests between the ants and their culti-
vated fungi, in opposition to the garden parasite, is further
illustrated by the contribution the ants make to cultivar
defense. Specifically, the ants employ specialized behav-
iors to physically remove parasitic inoculum from the fun-
gus garden [44]. Without ant behavioral defenses, the
garden is rapidly overgrown by the parasite [15], indicat-
ing that defense against Escovopsis requires cooperation
between ants and their fungal mutualists. The early origin
of Escovopsis within the symbiosis and its coevolutionary
history with the ants and their fungal cultivar [31], sug-
gests that the parasite may have been a stabilizing force
within the ant-fungal mutualism for millions of years.
Our view of the stability of cooperation has largely devel-
oped out of game theory, especially the PD model [34]. In
the classic single interaction model, cheating is always
favored over cooperation (T > R > P > S, see methods
above and Fig. 2a). However, when the model involves
multiple interactions among players (IPD), strategies that
are cooperative but capable of retaliating against cheating
can out-compete cheating strategies (e.g., the well-known
TFT). As outlined above, our empirical results indicate
that a parasite has the potential to alter the payoff matrix
so that cooperation is favored over cheating in the single
interaction PD model. This illustrates the potential for
third parties to alter the dynamics of cooperation in ways
that shape mutualism stability. Our simulations revealed
that even at relatively low prevalence parasitism can select
for stability of a cooperative strategy that is incapable of
retaliating against cheating. Specifically, 'always coopera-
tive' out-competes 'always defect' when 51% of interact-
ing partners in a population are infected, which is well
within the known infection rates in the fungus-growing
ant mutualism. When TFT was integrated into the simula-
tion, surprisingly, we found that 'always cooperative'
forms a stable population at infection levels of 10%, and
Prisoner's Dilemma simulationsFigur  2
Prisoner's Dilemma simulations. Graphical output from 
DILEMMA, a computer program simulating the Iterated Pris-
oner's Dilemma (IPD) with the ability to incorporate para-
sites into the classic model to determine how prevalent 
parasite would need to be within populations to help favour 
cooperation over cheating. A) In the traditional IPD, the 
strategy "always defect" quickly eliminates the purely cooper-
ative strategy "always cooperate" from the population. B) 
When parasitism is introduced into the population, "always 
cooperate" becomes a dominant strategy when infection 
rates are greater than 50% in the population. C) Strategies 
that combine cooperation with retaliation, such as "tit for 
tat", are successful in a heterogeneous population of strate-
gies in the IPD (strategies defined in Supplementary Table 2). 
D) In the presence of parasites, "always cooperate" becomes 
a viable and dominant strategy in a heterogeneous population 
at parasitism levels as low as 35%. Output was generated 
using populations of 10,000 individuals, which engaged in 25 
interactions per generation, for 500 generations. Each graph 
depicts the mean of 100 independent runs of the DILEMMA 
program. Standard error (SE) bars are not shown because 
values are less than 4.92 × 10-3, with the exception of the 
data points at 0.5 parasitism (b), which have SEs of 0.479.Page 6 of 9
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35%. These findings provide theoretical support to our
empirical results from the fungus-growing ant mutualism,
further suggesting that parasites can provide an external
sanction against one partner's cheating, or simply alter the
costs and benefits received from cooperation versus cheat-
ing in such a way that natural selection favors coopera-
tion.
We believe our findings are applicable beyond the fungus-
growing ant microbe-symbiosis. Mutualisms in which
survival and reproduction are tightly linked to coopera-
tion are especially likely to be stabilized by antagonists, as
morbidity and mortality in one partner is expected to have
a significant cost to the other; this is complimentary to
partner fidelity feedback [8]. Protective mutualisms, in
which one partner defends the other from a natural
enemy, are common in nature. Just as fungus-growing
ants protect their mutualistic fungi from parasites, there
are ants that protect plants from herbivores [49], bacteria
that protect their insect hosts from disease [29], and endo-
phytic fungi that protect their plant hosts from herbivores
via secondary metabolite production [50]. Our results
support the prediction that in these interactions it is likely
that when the threat imposed by a tertiary symbiont (i.e.
predator, parasite) is absent, the protective mutualism
may break down. Indeed, a recent paper by Palmer et al.
[51] revealed the breakdown of an ant-plant mutualism in
the absence of large-herbivores. Furthermore, the contri-
bution symbionts make to protect their hosts, which
appear to be widespread (see [52]) may be evidence of
parasites aligning the interests of mutualists.
Conclusion
Cooperative relationships that occur in natural systems
persist in complex ecological communities where inter-
specific interactions are continuous. In some instances
one, or a combination, of the models included in the
Sachs et al. framework of directed reciprocation, shared
genes, and by-product benefits, adequately explains stable
cooperation among organisms. However, our results sug-
gest that a third species eliciting selective pressure on one
member of a mutualism can limit cheating by a mecha-
nism that does not neatly fit the current framework.
Cooperative dynamics in which two partners have their
selfish interests aligned in opposition to a third (parasitic)
party, can provide a stabilizing force that helps maintain
cooperation between species, that is neither a by-product
(e.g. coincident of a selfish action), nor directed reciproca-
tion. Additionally, it is important to be clear that parasit-
ism need not be a mutually exclusive factor stabilizing
cooperation. It is possible, and perhaps likely, that para-
site pressure works in concert with other well-defined
mechanisms that promote cooperation. It would be inter-
esting to empirically test how the addition of a third par-
asitic species influences cooperative interactions that are
believed to be governed by reciprocation, by-product ben-
efits or shared genes.
Cooperation and conflict within the fungus-growing ant microbe symbiosisFigur  3
Cooperation and conflict within the fungus-growing 
ant microbe symbiosis. A) Fungus-growing ants forage for 
substrate to nourish their cultivated fungus, which they also 
groom to help remove garden parasites. B) In return, the 
fungus serves as the primary food source for the ants; with 
some species producing nutrient-rich hyphal swellings 
(gongylidia) that the ants preferentially feed on. Cooperation 
and conflict is inherent to the ant-fungus mutualism (black 
arrows, head points toward recipient of benefit), with each 
symbiont receiving a benefit (+), at a cost to the other (-). 
Natural selection favors symbionts that increase their own 
fitness selfishly by exploiting their partner, receiving a benefit 
(+) without paying the cost (-) associated with providing a 
benefit in return. C) The mutualism is parasitized by special-
ized fungi in the genus Escovopsis, which acquire nutrients 
from the fungus garden at a direct and indirect cost to the 
cultivated fungus and ants, respectively. Cooperation is 
enforced, and cheaters minimized, because the selfish inter-
ests of both ants and cultivated fungus are aligned (orange 
triangle) against the parasite Escovopsis.Page 7 of 9
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